How have the Inter-American human rights bodies dealt with the notion of war, which has been transformed over time into the notion of (internal and international) "armed conflicts"? This question has guided the first part of this study, which sets out the various types of conflicts that have occurred in the American continent. These situations (armed conflicts, internal strife, State terrorism) have produced a wide range of legal qualifications, used by both the Inter-American Commission and Court of human rights in their case-law. This conceptual delimitation carried out by these two bodies is all the more important as it affects the law that applies to armed conflicts. Indeed, by analyzing this question, the everlasting debate on the relationship between International Law on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law reappears. The second part of this study therefore focuses on the issue of discovering whether and in which way jus in bello has found its place in the Inter-American Human Rights bodies' case-law. As the active political life of Latin American societies has shown, the study of the different applicable legal regimes also requires looking into the "state of emergency" Law, an issue which has been shaped by the Inter-American Court and Commission's work.
I. INTRodUCTIoN
Mankind has torn itself apart during the course of the twentieth century to such a degree and in so many ways that the concept of war, which hitherto penetrated all the international instruments between both world wars, 1 has become dated. Since 1945, it has given way to the broader concept of "armed conflict."
2 Whereas the twentieth century was the scene of radical changes, the twenty first century carries the hallmarks of a spreading geopolitical disorder. The era of "American hyper-power" 3 has replaced the bipolar order of the Cold War; "internal armed conflicts" have eclipsed traditional warfare between states, 4 so much so that the politics of terror have invaded every
Vol. 33 150 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY nook and cranny of the "global village" 5 by unsettling every known order of importance and by allowing obscurantism to spread on all sides.
The American continent has been particularly affected by this upheaval in international relations inherently tied to contemporary forms of armed conflict: guerrilla warfare, counter-guerrilla operations, civil wars, and statesponsored terror. 6 The use of armed force and/or terror by the state and by other groups, acting with and without government support, often to establish authoritarian political regimes and eliminate alleged subversive individuals marked the past of many countries in South America. Furthermore, authoritarian regimes and armed conflict were often preceded by some internal crises that sadly led some governments to adopt exceptional measures, which would often expand rapidly through the region. 7 In some countries, 5 . All the way to the skyscrapers of New York: the Twin Towers attack has put the United States in a difficult and contradictory position whereby they recognized that they were at "war," but that, nevertheless, they would not acknowledge al-Qaida combatants as "regular combatants. this legacy continues to be an obstacle to the development and spread of democracy in the region. 8 The variety in the expressions of violence, which are not always akin to traditional warfare, shows that the nature of the conflict is a central question when seeking to clarify the Inter-American jurisprudence in the region. Following the identification of the different types of conflict situations the agencies of the Inter-American system have addressed in the past, this article evaluates the positions of the Inter-American Commission and the InterAmerican Court on the law applicable to the identified conflicts.
II. THE PRoTEAN NATURE of CoNfLICTS
The Inter-American Court has been called upon to examine matters where the scars of radical violence, perpetrated by private individuals as well as by state agents, have torn apart the civil peace of many Latin-American communities through the orchestration of massacres, forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and torture. The first obstacle the Court met was that of identifying the different types of conflicts which are particularly difficult, sometimes even impossible, to perceive. The determination of the nature of the conflict is crucial in light of the political instrumentalization of the terms "war," "armed conflict," or even "state of emergency" by some governments, which have almost exclusively based their policies on the vital need to fight terrorism. 9 To categorize the types of conflicts that have afflicted the American continent, one could start by differentiating armed conflicts from internal disturbances. However, even if the theoretical line of demarcation separating these two situations were based on the degree of intensity of violence, this line would prove extremely difficult to plot with any great precision. In addition, the history of the continent shows that violence has not at all been confined to the aforementioned types of violence. State-sponsored terrorism was a feature during the darkest hours of the dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s in the "Southern Cone" and of the authoritarian regimes of Central America. The specificity of state-sponsored terrorism is such that it needs to be analyzed separately.
A. Armed Conflicts versus Internal disturbances
Situations described as "armed conflict" have been analyzed through the classical approach of applying the relevant body of rules of international humanitarian law as expounded by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Under this approach, a distinction was thus logically drawn between the notion of armed conflict (internal or international) on the one hand, and simple "internal disturbances and tensions" on the other. 10 The Inter-American Commission has expressly noted the systemic differences between the two situations and has highlighted the importance of making that distinction.
The Court has had the opportunity-initially within the ambit of its advisory function 11 and, subsequently through its judicial function 12 to outline the broad parameters of the legal regime of emergency. 13 However, the Court has not dealt with the task of qualifying the nature of facts so as to determine whether they indicate "simple" internal disturbances, which are outside the scope of humanitarian law, or armed conflicts characterized by more extreme violence, which are subject to jus in bello.
14 To the extent that the Inter-American Commission has jurisdiction, it has full discretion in drawing a firm and steady line between cases which are sufficiently serious and ones that are not. Yet, the Commission affirmed early on that an "objective analysis of the facts in each particular case" is required in order to determine with any precision the nature of a conflict. 15 The Inter-American bodies follow the principles expounded by the ICRC. The Commission recently stated that the determination of the nature of a conflict should be based on the factual conditions, not on the recognition or on the qualification of the situation made by the parties to the conflict.
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The above is of particular importance in the case of Colombia whose former President launched a "war of words" that was symptomatic of the political instrumentalization of terror. In a hearing before the Inter-American Court, President Uribe denied the recognition of the guerrilla and paramilitaries as combatants indicating that they are "terrorists" and should not be qualified as combatants. 17 Of course, this type of political discourse is not taken into account by the Inter-American Court which consistently strives to place human rights violations within their historical context in order to juridically qualify the conflict. With regards to the Colombian cases, 18 the Court has consistently applied this contextual approach in its categorization and legal evaluation of the acts of the parties involved (guerrilla, governmental armed forces and "paramilitaries"). It explicitly includes in its judgments, starting with the case of the Mapiripán Massacre, an ad hoc section entitled 16 The Court begins with a historical analysis of the conflict and the paramilitary groups. The conflict was said to have originated at the beginning of the 1960s with the appearance of armed guerilla groups, and then identifies the response of the state.
20 By highlighting the context in which the famous "self-defense groups" arose, the Court puts forth the idea that it was the state who promoted the creation of said groups by recruiting and arming civilians whose declared purpose was to protect themselves against guerilla groups.
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The resulting conflict was to be expected as the state had delegated its powers to private groups with impunity. During the middle of the 1980s, the self-defense groups changed and managed to escape the control of the state. The Court indicates they became criminal groups, usually known as "paramilitaries" 22 who committed many human rights violations and, in some instances, colluded with governmental armed forces.
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The Valle Jaramilllo case illustrates the macabre and fatal understanding between the paramilitaries and the national army which acted jointly to assassinate Jesús María Valle Jaramillo. 24 As a lawyer working for the defense of human rights, Valle Jaramillo actively denounced, as of 1996, the crimes perpetrated by the paramilitaries as well as their collaboration with the national army. 25 While the Colombian government recognized its failure to duly protect his life and used all means possible to ensure that the parties were investigated and prosecuted, it refused to recognize any collusion resulted from a state-induced "context of persecution" against human rights defenders. 26 This legal tactic-refusing to accept the political involvement as part of the analytical framework 27 -is regularly used by the government of Bogota, but was not accepted by the Court in San José. The historic ap- (Emphasis added).
The Inter-American Court caught up with the European Court-or is it the other way round?-and set out the conditions for establishing state responsibility, which go even further than its European counterpart. 33 Indeed, while the Court often acknowledges, namely in the Colombian cases, that the state has adopted legal reforms to prevent and punish the activities of paramilitary groups, the Court also notes that these measures have not resulted in an effective deactivation of the existing risk. Thus, not only is the state responsible for errors of the past-in spite of its current attempts to resolve the conflict-but it also bears an "aggravated responsibility" for such acts.
The existence of this real and objective risk, resulting from the participation of paramilitary groups in the Colombian conflict, accentuates the special obligations of prevention and protection borne by the state in areas where paramilitary groups are present. The Court in San José solemnly recalled this factor in relation to human rights defenders, 34 whose vulnerability the Court has highlighted. Vulnerability is a major interpretive criterion used regularly to impose stronger obligations on states, 35 and it is also one of the key considerations of the Inter-American judiciary. The Inter-American Court does not hesitate to trigger mechanisms of positive discrimination in order to require states to adopt policies that combat glaring structural inequalities. 42 were at the source of a trans-border terror code named Operation Condor given to an "alliance of security forces and intelligence services'' of the dictatorships of the Southern Cone. 43 They were the lethal agents of undertakings where state terrorism reached its climax.
This period of authoritarian dictatorships has been illustrated in numerous art works, notably in the field of cinema, 44 and has been the subject of many research projects. These works are historical, 45 literary, 46 and of course legal in nature. The legal works are available in abundance. 47 They can be exceptionally valuable when they use sociological tools to decipher the intricacies of massive violations of human rights. In that regard, the French publication of the work of the American academic Mark Oisel is significant in that it reveals the shortcomings of transitional justice as part of the makeup of the collective memory of nations and communities. 48 The state-sponsored terror was not only identified but also condemned by the Court in San José through "historical" cases. Indeed, the judgments in 37 49 and Goiburú 50 brought to judicial light the trans-border terror 51 and the subsequent responsibility of states for having orchestrated the perpetration of crimes against humanity. The Court declared, in accordance with the body of international law, such crimes could not remain unpunished and would not be susceptible to amnesty. 52 The Goiburú case was also an opportunity for the Court to affirm, once again in a pioneering effort, that the prohibition of the forced disappearance of persons and the corresponding obligation to investigate and punish those responsible would obtain the status of jus cogens. 53 Thus, the Court in its effort to fight impunity developed the theory of the presumption of death in the ground-breaking case Velásquez Rodríguez, 54 and came full circle in determining that access to justice in the case of forced disappearances formed part of jus cogens.
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Even if today the face of litigation under the Inter-American system is slowly changing-now dealing with questions more "typical" of democratic societies 55 -the Court will still have to deal with cases stemming from "wars" or other types of conflict mainly because some countries are finding it hard to get rid of their old demons and, most importantly, because of the time factor. Often, a lot of time goes by-sometimes long after the events occurred-before a case brought before the Commission by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and/or victims or their relatives are heard by the Inter-American Court. 56 In this regard, the determination of the existence of an aggravated responsibility as a way of confronting trans-border assassinations, disappearances, torture, and detentions, all tied to state terrorism, is of capital importance for the Court in its own attempts to avert a repetition of these occurrences as well as in its fight against impunity.
While the Court has highlighted the aggravated responsibility and the "special obligations" of the state in cases where the violations of the American Convention of Human Rights were perpetrated by groups of private individuals, it goes without saying that the Court was able to reiterate its views in cases where massive violations were directly perpetrated by agents of the state. Therefore, the Court condemns the fact that "the State's power was orchestrated as a means and resource to violate rights that should have 
III. THE LAW APPLICAbLE To CoNfLICTS
The importance of distinguishing between the notion of armed conflict and simple internal disturbances is that it will indicate the law that shall govern the particular situation. The Inter-American Commission, in accordance with current international law, 60 has expressly noted the regime differences between the two types of disturbances and illustrated the importance of the distinction. It finds that "riots, sporadic acts of violence and nonorganized rebellions"-if they are short-lived and are not characterized as serious-are in principle excluded from the protection of the laws of war in accordance with Article 1(2) of the Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions. [T]his aggravated responsibility does not exist, and neither does attenuated responsibility, because simple responsibility (without considerations of intensity or nuance) implies the possibility or need to respond for certain acts owing to legal evidence of attribution that links specific conduct to a particular person who must respond for it juridically by the establishment of certain consequences. On the other hand, even if the laws of war do not apply to internal crises, human rights law continues to play a part. Certainly, state's recourse to a state of emergency does not amount to the complete exclusion of the rule of law nor does it endow the state with arbitrary powers. Also, the "state of emergency" clause does not exempt the state's obligations under human rights conventions, especially the American Convention.
See Case of Myrna
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In tackling the topic of the law applicable to armed conflicts, we are faced with the recurring problem of the interconnection between two main branches of international law: human rights and international humanitarian law. 63 This question has recently taken on a much less academic turn with the burgeoning of international courts 64 The ICJ has reaffirmed this position in the case of the Wall in the Palestinian Occupied Territory, noting that, in a situation of armed conflict, the governing law over the right to life is international humanitarian law, as opposed to human rights law. 68 However, its position was nuanced by the statement that "[in] regards [to] the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law." 69 The Court went one step further in abandoning this radical division between the two legal branches in a case concerning armed activities on the territory of the Congo. 70 In this case there was no reference to lex specialis by the ICJ, which indicated that "both branches of international law, namely international human rights law and international humanitarian law, would have to be taken into consideration." Such positions taken by the ICJ provided the impetus for much legal commentary where some authors took the opportunity to put forth the idea that the Inter-American Commission together with the Inter-American Court had, for a long time, had to deal with the complex relationship between human rights law and humanitarian law. 72 While the law of armed conflicts is at the heart of the debate (Part A), one must not ignore the law of emergency situations. The Inter-American Court has worked hard to set out with precision the limits of the derogation clause of Article 27 of the American Convention and the necessary respect by the states of the principles inherent to any democratic society (Part B).
A. The Law of Armed Conflicts
The central question posed to the Commission and then to the Inter-American Court has been the question of the law applicable to armed conflicts while neither their function nor their terms of reference bear any relation, at first glance, to the law of war. While the role of international humanitarian law in the Inter-American system once appeared problematic-as with respect to the difference in approach between the two legal branches of the systemthe situation has now been resolved and the Inter-American system, on this question too, appears to be one step ahead of the European system. The jus in bello is not the body of law which human rights judges are responsible for applying; the Inter-American system of law functions independently from this rule. 73 Article 62(3) of the American Convention clearly defines the limits of the Court's jurisdiction ratione materiae 74 and nowhere does it include the law of armed conflicts. The Court in San José highlighted from an early stage that it reserved the possibility of relying on "international treaties" other than the American Convention for the purpose of interpreting the latter 75 -while at the same time turning this approach into a genuine interpretative strategy-there is nevertheless room for doubt on the question of their application to the facts of cases examined by the Court.
Whereas interpretation does not formally mean application, nevertheless the Inter-American Commission tried to ignore this distinction. The case of La Tablada 76 is at the heart of a dispute of importance between the Commission and the Court on this question. 77 This was a very famous case in South America, which involved an attack of several Argentinean military barracks by a group of individuals belonging to the movement "All for the Fatherland" (Todos por la Patria). 78 The armed confrontation, which lasted almost thirty hours, led to the death of twenty-nine people among them assailants and many members of the armed forces. Survivors of the attack alleged that the military refused their offer of surrender and at the end of the combat, four individuals were summarily executed and six others were the victims of forced disappearances. 79 In its examination of the petition, the Commission considered that it had the jurisdiction to directly apply international humanitarian law. This assertion was, to say the least, audacious.
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The Court settled this issue in the case of Las Palmeras.
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In the case of Las Palmeras, the national police acted in concert with Colombian armed forces to carry out an armed operation in the locality of Las Palmeras causing the death of six individuals. Those responsible for the killings tried to justify their conduct by explaining that the deaths of the villagers were the consequence of combat between "subversive" groups; they tampered with the evidence and threatened the witnesses in order to hush up the events. While the disciplinary proceedings resulted in acquittal of the perpetrators, the military criminal procedures were still at the investigative phase when the Inter-American Commission-following receipt of a petition dated 27 January 1994-submitted its report four years later. The Colombian government filed five preliminary objections, which the Court had to respond to before considering the merits of the case. 83 These objections respectively dealt with a violation of due process by the InterAmerican Commission (first objection), the lack of competence of the Court and the Commission to apply international humanitarian law (second and third objections), the failure to exhaust remedies under domestic law (fourth objection) and finally, the lack of competence of the Court to act as a trial court (fifth objection). 84 The Court admitted two of the five preliminary objections and, in so doing, defined the limits of the law it was able to apply. The Court's response was clear and unequivocal. The American Convention "has only given the Court competence to determine whether the acts or the norms of the States are compatible with the Convention itself and not with the 1949 Geneva Conventions."
85 Such deference by the Court in San José to the principle of the attribution of competences has been criticized in the name of the mutual relationship between human rights law and international humanitarian law, which the Court may not have wanted to acknowledge and promote. While the Court's position remained unchanged in the case of Bámaca Velásquez, it did however take the time to demonstrate that the failure to apply international humanitarian law did not entail its exclusion as a tool for interpretation. 90 All of these elements-always related to the promotion of Colombian constitutional law-allowed the Court to note a "grave deprivation of the use and enjoyment of property" probados) to the presentation of the "Background and historical context." Moreover, it commented in that section on the combats stating that: We find within the European universe a similar exemplary demonstration of constructive interpretation. 93 Nevertheless, there features a notable exception that continues to raise a lot of criticism: the express exclusion of The Hague and Geneva Conventions from the external sources of law used to support a purposive interpretation. 94 Will there be a reversal in the European Court's approach perhaps inspired by the Inter-American jurisprudence? While, in the very important case of Sergueï Zolotoukhine, 97 and that of the European Court of Justice to significantly change its approach on the meaning of the double-jeopardy principle non bis in idem, we can easily imagine that, will demonstrate a similar attitude in relation to the role of the Geneva Conventions as a guide for interpretation. This reversal is to be expected if we take into account the criticism, albeit indirect, addressed by the Inter-American Court to its European counterpart. Indeed, it has affirmed on several occasions that even if the principle of proportionality is important and useful-in the context of determining the scope of an individual right-this principle is not so well adapted when applied to military operations and a context of generalized violence.
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b. The Law of States of Emergency
Latin-American authoritarian regimes indulged, in the course of the 1970s and 1980s, in an abuse, if not an instrumentalization, of the theory of exceptional circumstances. 99 The Uruguayan lawyer Hector Gros Espiell-who was President of the Inter-American Court between 1989 and 1990-describes it very clearly in one of his lectures at The Hague Academy. 100 Mr. Espiell's discussion indicates that exceptional measures-which must not at all lead to the suspension of either the constitution or the rule of law-have served, on many occasions in Latin America, to abolish the constitution and to overthrow legitimate governments in order to usurp power. In the same vein, he argues that states of emergency have often been used to conceal a the prosecution or trial of a second "offence in so far as it arises from identical facts or facts which are substantially the same." (Emphasis added military coup or as a curtain to hide the early stages of tyrannical regimes.
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The observation is undeniable and points to a pattern which has long been part of the political culture of emergency within the Americas. If the use of exceptional circumstances was, and perhaps still is, common in the continent, it is nevertheless not easy to grasp. Indeed, the many expressions used in constitutional law-"state of siege," "state of emergency," "state of war," "state of exception"-are not always appropriate while the international legal doctrine wraps up all the possibilities under the expression "state of emergency" or "exception."
102 In particular, it is not easy to define a state of emergency. The American Convention does not contain a detailed definition 103 and it would be almost impossible to create a unique category to encompass such a variety of situations. a willingness on the part of the authors of the Convention not to define a priori the situations so as to avoid the risk of being too limiting. 104. Two possible definitions arise out of this notion. The first would define the state of emergency in light of its effects on the respect for fundamental rights and the State's obligations in this regard. Thus, it would be a matter of linking the concept to the arising exceptional circumstances in contrast with a situation of "normality." The second possibility would be to ascertain the existence of a set of conditions required to distinguish de jure states, officially proclaimed and which adhere to a legal order, from de facto states, which exist even if the State does not recognize them. See fitzPatrick, Human rigHts in crisis: tHe internationaL system for Protecting rigHts During states of emergency 4-18 (1994). Both definitions are characterized by significant shortcomings. The first, a substantive definition, would require the causes, which provide grounds for a state of emergency to be declared, to be established. Thus, that situation can then be distinguished from situations which, even if exceptional, could not lead to the adoption of extreme measures by governments. The second definition, more formal, would depend on the recognition of the situation by the State. This mechanism carries its own risks and would also require a scale of different levels of seriousness in order to match the development of the state's emergency powers. The rapporteur to the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Nicole Questiaux, undertook a study on states of emergencies at the start of the 1980s. The study showed that natural disasters, under-development and war were among the causes of emergencies. Subject to strictly formal conditions, she established a typology of the different possible "deviations": formal emergency not notified to the international monitoring bodies ; permanent emergency, based on the continued extension in time of the formal conditions of the emergency; complex emergency, involving the confusion of legal regimes through the partial suspension of constitutional guarantees and the issuing of a large volume of "decrees," and finally, institutionalized emergency, where the transitional emergency regime is extended with the aim of returning to democracy; These are all elements which have been clarified by the doctrine of the Commission and by the Court's case law. In one of its reports on Colombia, the Inter-American Commission stated that the conditions deriving from the state of siege "which has been in effect almost without interruption for several decades have become an endemic situation which has hampered, to a certain extent, the full enjoyment of civil freedoms and rights in that, among other things, it has permitted trials of civilians by military courts." 111 It recommends that the state put an end to this situation, 112 which reflects a constant aspect of its analysis, given that the state of emergency must be exceptional and should neither be extended nor used as a means of justifying continued violations of human rights. 113 Thus, the Inter-American Court has relied on a restrictive interpretation of Article 27(1) of the American Convention-consistent with European case law 114 -and has said that "the suspension of guarantees may not exceed the limits of that strictly required to deal with the emergency, any action on the part of the public authorities that goes beyond those limits . . . would also be unlawful notwithstanding the existence of the emergency situation." 115 Similarly, in the important case of Zambrano Vélez, the Court took care to show the particularities of the use of armed forces to control serious social unrest were more related to a phenomenon of widespread criminal delinquency. 116 In addition to finding that the Ecuadorian state had not complied in that case with any of the required formalities of Article 27(3) of the the doctrine of the Commission and the Court's case law have developed in a landscape characterized by dictatorships. Their contribution to both international human rights law and international humanitarian law is essential and certainly provides food for thought on the topical issue of the complementarity between these two great branches of international law.
